逍遥居

逍遥居
people who have no position or money but have only courage and character are always before political leaders.

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stupid dog leads clever sheep flock, such a world
寻找不同的路线
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作者:laiyinhate_xie 提交日期:2008-10-15 17:30:00 | 分类:E文 | 访问量:1356

寻找不同的路线
新兴经济会改变全球经济的格局么?

"美国一直是中国的榜样," Yu Yongding说,一位北京知名经济学家."现在它已弄出了这么大的乱子,我们当然得再重新考虑了."

全球经济的未来依赖于在北京以及其他新兴世界里发生的怎样的"重新思考".至今,各种信号还是很混乱,甚至在相同国家.在印度,例如,中央银行---一直是不太情愿的自由化者---近来改变了允许信用违约互换(credit-default swaps) 的想法,辩护说,次贷危机显示,这个时间段不适宜如此创新.但到8月底,印度发行了外贸交易货币(exchange-traded currency)的衍生产品,给人们一种方式去抵御卢比的波动.

中国官员一直不常公开提起华尔街的失败.但正当几个发达国家那样,从英国到澳大利亚,禁止或者限制短期买卖(卖掉借来的股票)来无序地阻止股票价格下跌,中国国务院允许投资者用贷款买股票和做短期买卖.

大多数情况下,新兴经济对于安格鲁-撒克逊经济体系的态度是相当实际的.这主要更多来源于20世纪90年代他们自身的金融危机的教训,而不是今天华尔街的大灾难.那次的危机造成了的经济痛苦比发达国家至今所能看到的任何危机都大得多.墨西哥的GDP,例如,在1995年下跌6%,印度尼西亚1998年下跌13%.

那些经济体坍塌造成了深刻的教训:外国货币债务是危险的,国际货币组织要尽可能的躲避,建立巨大外汇储备的专款时需要格外谨慎.尤其,发达国家有相当于他们GDP 4%的外汇储备.新兴经济体过去的水平是差不多一样的.但二十多年过去,比率已经升到了GDP的20%.中国有庞大的1.8万亿美金,其他八个新兴经济体每个都有1000多亿美金.

乍看,充裕的储备使新兴经济体能平稳发展.这也是为什么这些国家在今天全球混乱的情况下一直表现得如此有韧性.但,正如这篇特别报导所辩论的,这些专款带来了畸形发展和死板.这些助长了全球的经济泡沫和国内的通胀.对于 新兴经济体的挑战是,创造一个更灵活也更安全的全球经济体.

学术证明是不太令人确定的.20世纪90年代危机之后,经济学家们开始仔细观察贫穷国家从和全球资本市场整合中得到什么好处.答案似乎不是很多.2007年Cornell大学Eswar Prasad,芝加哥大学的Raghu Rajan和Peterson机构的Arvind Subramanian,为Brookings 研究机构发表了一篇有影响力的研究报告显示,依赖于本国储蓄支撑投资的穷国家增长要比更多依赖外国资本的国家快得多.

外国资本似乎没有帮助新兴经济体更好的处理收入打击.在另一份报告理,Prasad,和货币组织的Ayhan Kose, Marco Terrones,展示新兴经济体消费的多变近几年来一直在增加.有着弱的经济体系的穷国家,似乎不能处理外国资本的涌入.钱经常被导入到无生产力的领域,如房地产.这些钱似乎使经济的消涨周期变得更坏.

这些消息不都是坏的.研究也显示,外国直接投资和股票资金流入带来了技术,增进了企业的管理能力.有证据表明,来自外国银行和股市上外国资本的竞争力能够改善新兴经济体自身的经济体系.但在Volcker质疑美国全球化经济思想前,老早学术界就在重新考虑经济全球化对新兴经济体的影响.

忽略象牙塔
具有讽刺意味的是,在新兴经济体正在经济上和世界其他地区更加整合的时候,学术方面的反对也在产生.总的来说,新兴国家的市民有1万亿存在外国银行,从2002年来增长了3倍.无论用那种衡量手段,涉及到新兴经济体的资本总流量自20世纪90年代一直在增加,在过去几年里,还在加速.这些资金流的成分已经改变:外国直接投资和股票资金流量上升比债务快得多.但经济整合的总体水平是显著上升了不少.

经济全球化加速,部分因为是政府没有听从学术界的质疑.大多数国家继续开放,尤其对于股票资金和外国直接投资.按照国际货币组织在资本控制上的指数,只有两个新兴经济体在1995年到2005年关闭了他们的资本账户,而14个国家完全开放.剩下的国家处于中间的某个状态,但大多数正移向更大的开放.

同时,外国银行正在起着日益重大的角色.到2007年为止,差不多900个外国银行在发展中国家里都有业务.他们占银行贷款的平均比例,从20年前的20%上升到现在的40%.在一些地方,尤其是东欧和拉丁美洲,外国银行占据着本地的金融系统.即使在中国和印度,外国银行很慢介入的地方,在过去的20年里都已经开放了更多了.

更重要的是,金融整合,不管任何处心积虑的政策方式,都在加速.在全球化加速的世界里,即使有着严格资本控制的国家,在资金流上都有了增加. 一种解释是,更多的贸易不可避免地产生更多的资本整合.一个金融基础设施的完善支撑了全球供应链.大的贸易流使得企业更容易逃避资本控制,通过多开或者低开交易发票.而快速的增长使得新型经济体吸引了外国投资者和他们自身市民旅居海外,这样他们能够找到方式绕过资本控制.

和资本控制相关的畸形发展和成本,随着新型经济体的更加全球化而逐渐升高. 为了遏制资本突然增多还采取的临时税收可能还能起到一定的作用,即使他们有时会产生负作用.例如,泰国在2006年在外国资本流入上加证税收,但看到的是市场顿挫,所以只能改变决定.在长期的范围里,这些方法所引起的畸形会变得更沉重.例如,中国在大的新型经济体中有着一些最严格的控制,部分使他们和全球资本市场隔离开来.但需要吓阻投机资本的控制手段开始变得更有侵犯性.自7月份国家外汇管理局要求更多的出口收入的信息.对于小规模的出口商,那就是一笔很大的负担.全球化的经济,最后,就是全球整合不可避免的部分.

这就意味着新兴经济体立即要问的问题,不是全球经济是不是好东西,而是怎样最大化收益和最小化成本.回答是更多的依赖市场,不是减少依赖,但尽量要避免发达国家所造成的错误.

在国内,那意味着要采取更多新经济策略.新兴经济体在他们本国经济发展中改变非常的大,但最大的几个经济体方式还是很原始.例如,印度有着相当老练的股票资本市场,但他的银行系统却欠发展,被政府的法令所限制.印度银行的贷款的40%被导向了"优先领域",例如农业,而主要市民的信贷来源是非正规的放贷者.

更难的问题是怎样去处理外国资本.首要任务应该是更大的货币灵活性.新兴经济体向全球资本流开放,其风险是不稳定.大量的钱涌入,涌出,驱使发展不完善的本地资本市场忽上忽下,并且影响经济体的真正的需求量.允许外国银行进入市场的国家将被这些银行在世界其他地方的财富所影响. 欧洲银行在美国抵押产品上的损失,例如,可能引起在Hungary更紧的信贷.

为了处理如此变化,新型经济体需要用发达国家的方式管理需求:通过更灵活的利率和汇率手段.随着资本流入的盈亏,通过调控汇率的上涨和下跌,新兴经济体应该一定能确定一种控制本地货币情况的方法.发展中国家的企业和投资者也需要安格鲁-撒克逊金融体系开发的风险共存的衍生产品.一些国家已经有了.有着外汇衍生产品的巴西市场,例如,就是世界上最老练,最透明的市场之一.其他的,尤其在亚洲,有更多发展的空间,虽然印度最近的革新是令人鼓舞的.

通过去除积累巨大的外汇储备的需要,更大的货币灵活性也会产生更多稳定的全球货币体系.储备的专款可能被用于促进本地的金融发展.在2008年,<<经济观察>>杂志夏天发行版里,Messrs Prasad 和Rajan提出了一个极具吸引力的设想.有着大量外汇储备的国家,如中国或者印度,可以让共同基金(本地或者外国)来用本地货币的方式发行股票,这样他们就可以用这些股票来从央行购买外汇.这些共同基金然后可以代表本地国民投资海外.这种结果将是一种控制的资本外流的自由化,同时国内创造出新的金融机构和手段.石油输出国可以通过给国民发放石油红利的方式达到相同的效果.这些红利能被相似的共同基金投资到海外.在这两种模式下,新兴经济体的国外资产管理将慢慢转移成私有部分.那就可以让来自中国或者沙特的私有投资者挑选华尔街待售资产.

国家的笨拙
目前,虽然趋势还是相反的方向.亚洲和新兴石油输出国的政府已经控制着差不多7万亿的金融资产,他们大多数是以货币储备的方式,其他是以主权财富基金的方式.在Mckinsey Global机构里的分析家们猜算,到2013年,总数可能达到15万亿.那将会使得政府控制的基金在全球资本市场里成为一个大的势力.这相当于全球保险公司资产的41%,全球共同基金的25%和全球养老金的1/3.

这有讽刺意味的是.大多新兴经济体对反市场的质疑声充耳不闻.那些人争辩,全球资金流是很危险的.但在抵制一种统计诱惑的时候,他们已经屈服于另外一个了:他们累积了巨大数目的资本在政府手上,在华尔街危机爆发之前很久就转变了全球经济的本质.然而,这些基金被专业地管理着,如此巨大的政府控制的资产将改变国家和市场的平衡.他们也会给全球整合增加风险:贸易保护主义的抬头.

原文:
Charting a different course
Oct 9th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Will emerging economies change the shape of global finance?
“THE United States has been a model for China,” says Yu Yongding, a prominent economist in Beijing.
“Now that it has created such a big mess, of course we have to think twice.”
The future of global finance depends on what kind of rethinking takes place in Beijing and the rest of the
emerging world. So far the signals have been mixed, even within the same country. In India, for
instance, the central bank—long a reluctant liberaliser—recently changed its mind about allowing creditdefault
swaps, arguing that the subprime crisis showed the time was not “opportune” for such
innovations. But at the end of August India launched exchange-traded currency derivatives, giving people
a means to hedge against fluctuations in the rupee.
Chinese officials have been unusually outspoken about Wall Street’s failures. But just as several rich
countries, from Britain to Australia, have banned or reined in short-selling (selling borrowed shares) in a
misguided effort to stop share prices falling, China’s cabinet agreed to allow investors to buy shares on
credit and sell shares short.
By and large, emerging economies’ attitude to Anglo-Saxon finance is deeply pragmatic, defined more by
the lessons of their own financial crises in the 1990s than by today’s calamities on Wall Street. Those
crises inflicted far greater economic pain than anything the rich world has seen so far. Mexico’s GDP, for
instance, fell by 6% in 1995 and Indonesia’s by 13% in 1998.
Those collapses held powerful lessons: foreign-currency debt was dangerous, the IMF was to be avoided
Illustration by Belle Mellor
at all costs and prudence demanded the build-up of vast war chests of foreign-exchange reserves. Rich
countries typically have foreign-currency reserves worth about 4% of their GDP. The level in emerging
economies used to be much the same, but over the past decade that ratio has risen to an average of
over 20% of GDP. China has a whopping $1.8 trillion, and eight other emerging economies have more
than $100 billion apiece.
At first sight, fat cushions of reserves have stood emerging economies in good stead. They are one
reason why these countries have proved so resilient in today’s global turmoil. But, as this special report
has argued, these war chests introduced many distortions and rigidities that helped to inflate the global
financial bubble and stoke domestic inflation. The challenge for emerging economies is to create a system
of global finance that is more flexible yet still safe.
The academic evidence is not reassuring. After the 1990s crisis economists began to look closely at what
poor countries gained from integration with global capital markets. The answer appeared to be not much.
An influential study for the Brookings Institution in 2007 by Eswar Prasad of Cornell University, Raghu
Rajan of the University of Chicago and Arvind Subramanian of the Peterson Institute showed that poor
countries that relied on domestic savings to finance their investment grew faster than those that relied
more on foreign money.
Nor did foreign capital seem to help emerging economies to cope better with sudden income shocks. In
another paper Mr Prasad, together with Ayhan Kose and Marco Terrones of the IMF, showed that the
volatility of consumption in emerging economies has increased in recent years. Poor countries with weak
financial systems, it appears, cannot cope with floods of foreign capital. The money is often channelled to
unproductive areas such as property. Such inflows seem to make boom-bust cycles worse.
The news was not all bad. Studies also showed that foreign direct investment and equity flows brought in
know-how and improved corporate governance. And the evidence also suggests that competition from
foreign banks and foreigners’ money in stockmarkets can improve emerging economies’ own financial
systems. But long before Mr Volcker questioned the wisdom of globalised finance in America, academics
were having second thoughts about the wisdom of financial globalisation for the emerging world.
Ignore the ivory tower
Ironically, this intellectual backlash was taking place even as emerging economies were becoming
financially ever more integrated with the rest of the world. All in all, the citizens of emerging countries
now have some $1 trillion deposited in foreign banks, a threefold increase since 2002. By every measure,
the gross flows of capital involving emerging economies have grown since the mid-1990s and accelerated
in the past few years. The composition of those flows has changed: foreign direct investment and equity
flows have risen much faster than debt. But the overall level of financial integration is up significantly.
Financial globalisation sped up partly because governments did not listen to the academic sceptics. Most
continued to open up, particularly to equity and foreign direct investment. According to the IMF’s index of
capital controls, only two emerging economies closed their capital accounts between 1995 and 2005,
whereas 14 countries opened up fully. The rest came somewhere in-between but were mostly moving
towards greater openness.
At the same time foreign banks were playing an ever bigger role. By 2007 almost 900 foreign banks had
a presence in developing countries. On average they accounted for some 40% of bank lending, up from
20% a decade earlier. In some places, particularly in eastern Europe and Latin America, foreign banks
dominate the domestic financial system. Even China and India, which have been slow to allow in foreign
banks, have opened up more in the past decade.
More important, financial integration was accelerating regardless of any deliberate policy choices. In a
fast-globalising world even countries with strict capital controls saw an increase in actual capital flows.
One explanation is that more trade inevitably produces more capital integration. A financial infrastructure
grows up to support global supply chains. Larger trade flows make it easier for firms to evade capital
controls, by over- or under-invoicing their transactions. And fast growth has made emerging economies
an attractive target for foreign investors and their own citizens living abroad, who can find ways to get
around capital controls.
The distortions and costs associated with capital controls are rising as emerging economies become more
globalised. Temporary taxes to discourage sudden surges of capital may still have a role to play, even
though they can sometimes prove counterproductive. Thailand, for example, imposed a tax on foreign
capital inflows into its stockmarket in 2006 but saw the market plunge and quickly reversed the decision.
In the longer term the distortions caused by such measures become more burdensome. China, for
instance, has some of the strictest controls among large emerging economies, partly insulating itself from
global capital markets, but the controls needed to deter speculative capital are becoming ever more
intrusive. Since July the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) has demanded more
information on export earnings. For many small-scale exporters that is a big burden. Globalised finance,
it turns out, is an inextricable part of global integration.
That means the right question for emerging economies to ask is not whether global finance is a good
thing but how to maximise the gains and minimise the costs. The answer is to rely more on markets, not
less, but try to avoid the mistakes that the rich world made.
At home that means adopting more of the new finance. Emerging economies vary enormously in their
domestic financial development, but some of the biggest are still surprisingly primitive. India, for
instance, has highly sophisticated equity markets but its banking system is underdeveloped and distorted
by government edicts. Some 40% of India’s bank loans are directed to “priority sectors” such as
agriculture, and the main source of credit for the typical citizen is the informal moneylender.
The harder question is how to deal with foreign capital. Top of the list should be greater currency
flexibility. The risk for emerging economies that open themselves up to global capital flows is
destabilisation. Money will slosh in and out, driving underdeveloped local asset markets up and down and
affecting the level of demand in the real economy. Countries that allow foreign banks to enter their
markets will be affected by these banks’ fortunes elsewhere in the world. Losses that European banks
make on American mortgage products, for instance, may cause tighter credit in Hungary.
To deal with such volatility, emerging markets need to manage demand in the way that rich nations do:
through more flexible interest rates and exchange rates. By allowing their exchange rates to rise and fall
as capital flows wax and wane, emerging economies should be able to keep a measure of control over
their domestic monetary conditions. Firms and investors in developing countries also need the risksharing
derivatives developed by Anglo-Saxon finance. Some already have them. Brazil’s market for
foreign-exchange derivatives, for instance, is one of the most sophisticated and transparent in the world.
Others, particularly in Asia, have much further to go, though India’s recent innovations are encouraging.
By removing the need to accumulate vast foreign-exchange reserves, greater currency flexibility would
also create a more stable global monetary system. The war chests of reserves could be used to boost
domestic financial development. In the summer 2008 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Messrs Prasad and Rajan offer an intriguing proposal. Countries with plenty of reserves, such as China or
India, could allow mutual funds (domestic or foreign) to issue shares in domestic currency with which
they could buy foreign exchange from the central bank. These mutual funds would then invest abroad on
behalf of domestic residents. The result would be a controlled liberalisation of capital outflows, along with
the creation of new financial institutions and instruments at home. Oil-exporting countries could achieve
much the same effect by issuing their citizens with an oil dividend that could be invested abroad through
similar mutual funds. Under both models the management of emerging economies’ foreign assets would
be shifted increasingly to the private sector. That would allow private investors from China or Saudi
Arabia to pick over the carcass of Wall Street.
The heavy hand of the state
At present, though, the trend is still in the opposite direction.
Governments in Asia and emerging oil exporters already control
some $7 trillion of financial assets, most of it in currency
reserves, the rest in sovereign-wealth funds. Analysts at the
McKinsey Global Institute reckon that the total could reach $15
trillion by 2013. That would make government-controlled funds
a large force in global capital markets, with the equivalent of
41% of the assets of global insurance companies, 25% of global
mutual funds and a third of the size of global pension funds
(see chart 11).
There is an irony here. By and large, emerging economies shut
their ears to the anti-market sceptics who argued that global
capital flows were dangerous. But in resisting one statist
temptation they have succumbed to another: they have accumulated vast sums of capital in government
hands, transforming the nature of global finance long before Wall Street’s implosion. However
professionally these funds are managed, such huge government-controlled assets will change the balance
between state and market. They will also add to the biggest risk for global integration: rising
protectionism.

#日志日期:2008-10-15 星期三(Wednesday) 晴 送小红花 推荐指数:复制链接 举报



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